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Resumen
El cambio institucional ocurrido en los últimos años en los países en desarrollo como Colombia 
soporta y legitimiza actividades productivas e innovativas. Pero esta dinámica reciente ha sido 
igno rada; por el contrario la literatura en ciencias sociales se ha concentrado en el estudio de las 
actividades destructivas y criminales. El problema de estudio es entender cómo en países como 
Colom bia, el desarrollo de sectores industriales formales como el software se basa en las redes 
informales existentes, las cuales emergen como una respuesta a las sociedades exclusivistas pre-in-
dustriales. En particular entender cómo el “Efecto Tunel”, término introducido por Albert Hirsch-
man en los 70’s, emerge como una organización alternativa para coordinar recursos productivos 
en  sociedades inequitativas. El estudio de caso es sobre Parquesoft, un ejemplo de esta nueva 
industria formal en Colombia basada en un grupo diferente de valores y objetivos que marcan la 
diferencia en la manera de hacer negocios y pensar el desarrollo. 
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Abstract
The institutional change in occurred in the last years in developing countries like Colombia  supports 
and legitimizes innovative and productive activities. But this recent dynamic has been missed; ins-
tead social science literature has been focused on the study of destructive and criminal activities. 
The study problem is to understand how in countries like Colombia, formal industrial sectors such 
as software development rely on existing informal networks, which emerged as a response to 
stringent and exclusivist pre-industrial societies. And in particular how the “tunnel effect”, term 
coined by Albert Hirschman in the 1970s, emerges as an organization alternative to coordinate 
productive resources within unequal societies. The study case is about Parquesoft, an example of 
this new formal industry in Colombia based in a different group of values and objectives that makes 
the difference in the way to make business and think the development. 
Key words: Parquesoft, entrepreneurship, software industry, cluster, institutional change.
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Introduction
The information and communication technology 
(ICT) paradigm could be at present, according to 
Perez (2002), going through its synergy period1. 
The constituent institutions within this period 
are related to high interactions, externalities and 
 increa sing returns in economic activity. In this same 
fashion, according to Nelson and Sampat (2001) 
and Lundvall (2004), these interactions take the 
form of “social technologies” and “organizational 
techno logies” that accompany the physical techno-
logies or techno logical innovations diffusion throug-
hout fi rms, markets and other institutions in society. 
This paper studies the “embeddedness” argument 
(Grannovetter, 1985; Markusen, 1994) and Perez’s, 
Nelson’s and Lundvall’s “social and organizational 
technologies and institutions”, emerging in the way 
of inter-personal, inter-fi rm and international social 
networks (and other variety of social capital) in a 
South American developing country like Colombia, 
particularly, in its infant and innovative software in-
dustry (Bortagaray, 2004).
The change in the institutional framework in deve-
loping countries like Colombia, in the last decade or 
so, supports and legitimizes innovative and produc-
tive activities. Unfortunately, social science literatu-
re has been focused on the study of destructive and 
criminal activities. This has missed recent important 
micro-phenomena at the institutional and social 
structure level, which constitute the undermath of 
transforming social and economic forces.
Our study problem is to evaluate how, in  developing 
countries like Colombia, formal industrial sectors 
such as software development rely on existing infor-
mal networks, which emerged as a response to strin-
gent and exclusivist pre-industrial societies. And in 
particular how the “tunnel effect” (i.e. social mobi-
lity through organized entrepreneurial forces), term 
coined by Albert Hirschman in the 1970s, emerges 
as an organization alternative to coordinate produc-
tive resources within unequal societies.
During the last 50 years, Colombia has  transformed 
itself from a mostly rural-populated country to a  mostly 
urban-populated. Big cities such as Bogotá (Capital 
city), Cali (in the Valle Department), and Barranquilla 
(in the Atlántico Department) have had disproportio-
nate levels of (net) immigration, due to several complex 
factors such as a pheripheral industrialization process 
and a rural confl ict that has spanned almost 60 years. 
This structural change in the population from rural to 
urban majority placed under pressure cities´ capacity 
to absorb labor  force- concentrated in the big cities 
like Bogotá, Cali, Medellín and Barranquilla. 
While migrants spend great part of their lifes (and 
even the lives of their children and grandchildren) 
within the reserve pool of labor in order to supposedly 
obtain better opportunities for a formal job, resources 
for survival come from temporary, unreported and 
unprotected activities. This is why increa sing immigra-
tion and the incapacity of the formal sector to absorb 
the new labor force, end up in high levels of informa-
lity, especially since the 1950s (Bushnell, 1993). The 
main 10 cities have accounted for increasing rates of 
informality and unemployment since 1950s reaching 
their peak levels in the late 1990s (over 50% and 20% 
respectively). As a result, the informal sector surfaced 
as a common pattern within the social structure as a 
consequence of a formal society unable to include the 
most vulnerable and marginalized sectors.
The emergence of an illegal sector, especially  since 
the 1970s, evolved readily within this context of 
sustained growth of the informal sector,  neglected 
from any State protection or control since the 
1950s. According to Rubio (1997) big cities that 
tradi tionally had been an example of regional manu-
facturing and economic development like Bogota, 
Cali and Medellin had become centers of greater 
violence since the 1970s.
The beginnings of the drug traffi cking in Colombia 
date from the 1960s, but it was only until the seventies 
that the production and commercialization of marijua-
na activated, as a response to the demand from the 
1 It happens right after the frenzy and recession periods (Perez, 2002).
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USA market. The origin of the “Cartels” of the drug 
date in the following order: Organization of the  Valley 
of the Cauca, the Cali Cartel (1970) Organization in 
Antioquia, the  Medellín Cartel (1976), The Ochoa 
Clan (1976), The Bogotá Cartel (1976) OAP1: The 
Armenia-Pereira Cartel (1978) The Leticia Cartel 
CA1 and the Atlantic Coast (Reveiz, 2006). 
 
The conformation of these highly divided and frag-
mented (formal, informal and illegal) sectors corres-
ponds roughly to the period between the 1950s and 
the 1970s in urban cities, although highly framed 
by a long-standing patronage system inherited from 
the XIX century. The following historical phase star-
ted approximately in the 1970s, with a snowballing 
informal economy. State’s ability to enforce laws, 
or to gain respect and loyalty through commands, 
was extremely deterred given its neglect (and even 
support) to illegal activities.
The de-legitimacy process of an exclusive State and 
individualistic elites generated the co-evolution of 
a process of alternative social regime with its own 
rules: lack of loyalty to the nation, as a whole, and 
strong loyalties to the family and other groups like 
cliques that are seen as necessary to survive a  hostile 
environment. This kind of social structures legitima-
tely arose as networks that guaranteed individual 
compliance within the societal group. 
We will present several stages in the evolution of the 
institutional framework of networks that  harnessed, 
in the fi rst stage, destructive activities, but have 
 evolved, at least to some degree, into innovative 
 activities related to the software sector.
1. First Phase: Crime “Bubble”, 
 and “Costly” Formality
Once predatory and rent-seeking behavior  became the 
norm to transfer arbitrary privileges of state and social 
elites, it snowballed into a social  “bubble”,  which con-
sists of a dishonesty trap where it is legitimate to break 
the rules that had favored a  traditionally privileged class 
(Thoumi, 1995). Society enforced this “breaking the 
rules” as social mobility, given a sustained exclusivist 
society and given that the formal way of social progre-
ss became extremely costly, especially when no ties or 
affi nity to elites existed. Under this state of affairs, the 
controlling power of the State remains powerless.
1.1 Inverse relation between growth in formal 
and illegal sectors 
The disorganization theory might help us explain a 
more static analysis of empirical evidence.  Criminal 
activities rise during the majority of the industrial manu -
facturing recessions over the period, and –vice versa- 
de cay when industrial manufacturing thrived. This 
inver se relationship between the growth in economic 
and criminal activities establish an interesting problem. 
Figure 1, poses formal and illegal sectors as competing 
for fl exible reserves of labor within the informal sector 
(relations B and F). This means that when the formal 
sector is unable to absorb idle  reserve labor, then the 
illegal sector presents itself as an interesting alternati-
ve for under or  unemployed sectors of society. This 
sustained informal  sector  poses a latent societal dicho-
tomy: to continue  fi nding a way to fi nally immerse in 
productive and growth activities –such as those studied 
by Portes,  Castells, and Benton (1989)2 – or fi nding a 
way in other  paths that would allow their survival or 
even greater level of income at a lower cost. Namely, 
informal and productive en tre preneurial dynamism 
would be the former way and criminal entrepreneu-
rial dynamism would be the the former way and cri-
minal entrepreneurial dynamism would be the latter 
(Baumol, 1990, 1993). In few words, a persistent and 
sustained informal sector for decades can either burst 
in favor of society, by fi nally immersing in productive 
society or, on the contrary, slowly divert against socie-
ty, immersing in criminal activities.
2 There are three types of informal economies: survival, dependent exploitation, and growth (Portes, Castells, and Benton 1989). 
The self-construction of shelter and the proliferation of street vending in cities of the Third World are commonly cited as examples 
of the fi rst type. The relationships between underground immigrant subcontractors, jobbers, and large fi rms in the U.S. apparel 
industry provide an example of the second. The highly successful networks of artisan microproducers in central Italy represent an 
instance of the third (Capecchi 1989).
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Figure 1.
Types of Economic Activities and their Interrelationships
I.  Defi nitions:
+ = Licit
 – = Illicit
Process of 
Production and Distribution Final Product Economic Type
+ + Formal
- + Informal
- - Criminal
II.  Societal Change
              Formal
C
       
           D
A  B
       
   Criminal      
 
       
      E
       F
            Informal
A. State interference, competition from large fi rms, sources of 
capital and technology.
B. Cheaper consumer goods and industrial inputs, fl exible re-
serves of labor.
C. State interference and disruption, supplies of certain contro-
lled goods.
D. Corruption, “gatekeeper’s rents” for selected state offi cials.
E. Capital, demand for goods, new income-earning opportunities.
F. Cheaper goods, fl exible reserves of labor.
Source: Castells and Portes, 1989, p.14
The following section will deal with a historical ana-
lysis of the evolution of social structure in a Latin 
American country as Colombia, showing that organi-
zed criminal sectors would constitute a social viable 
alternative after (not before) the perpetuation of an 
idle, unprotected and vulnerable social sector such 
as the informal economy. They might co-exist at 
present, but the origin and evolution are dissimilar. 
In sum, when the ability of networks to maintain 
so cial control is lost (Bursik and Grasmick 1993), a 
new (destructive) type of networks arise that chan-
nel crime within the context of a population’s labor 
instability Bursik and Grasmick. 
The social network failure, derived in a tolerance 
with illegal activities due to the lack or weakness 
of means for social control. The increase in expec-
tations for social advancement under a weakness 
to confront organized crime, generated a social 
 “bubble” in which stepping down from an informal 
job into a formal job was (and still is) costly3. Whilst 
stepping down from informality into a criminal ac-
tivity (or simply suspending exit from the informal 
sector) constituted a viable way for social mobility. 
Crime seemed, at least in its fi rst phase, “to pay” 
integrating a greater part of society in comparison 
to the formal sector. 
Moreover, since the main market of illegal drugs 
were rich countries; a type of “Robin Hood” effect 
(see Figure 2) reinforced the tolerance with illegal ac-
tivities because it supposedly contributed to a wealth 
transfer from rich to poor countries. However, it did 
not take many years before realizing that this wealth 
transfer from rich to poor countries actually was a 
fallacy, and a “Reverse Robin Hood Effect” ensued. 
It became evident that the Robin Hood Effect con-
sisted actually of type of entrepreneurship, namely 
destructive entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1990, 1993) 
that preys upon its own population and, especially, 
on productive entrepreneurship (Figure 2). 
Resilience to 
tolerance to 
criminal 
activities
3 The challenges of launching a business in Colombia are relatively costly respect to other Latin American countries as the World 
Bank’s Report “Doing Business” (2006) shows (www.doingbusiness.org). Entrepreneurs can expect to go through 13 steps to 
launch a business over 44 days on average, at a cost equal to 19.8% of gross national income (GNI) per capita. The diffi culties that 
employers in Colombia face in hiring and fi ring workers are the following. The indexes assign values between 0 and 100, with hig-
her values representing more rigid regulations. The Rigidity of Employment Index is an average of the three indices. For Colombia 
the overall index is 27.
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Figure 2.
2. Second Phase: 
 Resilience Against Crime
In the second phase, starting around the end of the 
80s, the “spell” was broken, refl ected in a  period of 
great economic and social deadweight during the 
1990s. This resilience fl ourished specially when 
it became evident that illegal activities used costly 
means for society like violence, co-action for “cap-
turing” public resources, taking control of the na-
tural resources, redistributing income and wealth 
preying upon their own population, obtaining high 
utilities by non-declared activities and tributary eva-
sion, the capture of the State and the economic be-
nefi ts of the violence, and generating high costs of 
security and justice. Once the society spotted this 
false “Robin Hood effect”, a subsequent reversal of 
expectations of social promotion through criminal 
activities suffi ced. The stepping down from informa-
lity to criminal activities began, at least partially, to 
be offset (Figure 1).
3. Third Phase: The Tunnel effect
In this third phase the focus of expectations turn 
around from the informality → criminal activities as 
social promotion, to a focus on the informality → 
formal activities as social promotion (Figure 3). Like 
in the beginnings of the industrialization process in 
mid-twentieth century, the cultural value of produc-
tive entrepreneurship is recovered but with a main 
difference: the social tilt, rather than the individual 
type, of entrepreneurship. 
The huge pool of idle or underemployed “reserve 
ar my”, represented in a sustained social inequality 
and a networking society, might have evolved and 
trans formed itself, especially in urban cities, into 
entrepreneurial forces of growth. De Soto (1989, 
2003) has extensively shown that informal enterpri-
se represents the irruption of real market and deve-
lopment forces. However, as we have shown pre-
viously, these entrepreneurial not necessarily are 
productive entrepreneurial forces, or at least, there 
must be some conditions through which these for-
ces could be channeled productively.
As we shall see, clustering organizations such as Par-
quesoft rely on the informal economies of growth 
(see Portes, Castells, and Benton 1989 and Portes 
and Haller 2003)4 given the necessary level of coor-
dination between formal organization and informal 
networking. The formal sector and the illegal sector 
compete for -parodying Marx- a “fl exible reserve 
army” (Relations B and F of Figure 1 - II) that are 
pro vided by the informal sector and, in turn, adop-
ting its institutional rules of trust and networks. The 
informal economy is dependent on social ties for 
its effective functioning. Granovetter (1985) labeled 
these social ties as “the problem of embeddedness” 
and are used for transactions “where the only re-
course against malfeasance is mutual trust by virtue 
of common membership in some overarching social 
structure” (Portes and Haller 2003). 
3.1 Coming to the point: The tunnel effect
The complex relation between individual advance-
ment and the social impact it generates, is framed 
under the term social entrepreneurship. The inter-
views and surveys done to entrepreneurs and staff 
in Parquesoft, as we shall see, in some way capture 
Efecto B
AA: growth
B: redistribution
A + B: development
Robin Hood effect: B
disguised as growth 
or development
4 Informal economies of growth. They may be organized for capital accumulation by small fi rms through mobilization of their solida-
rity relationships, greater fl exibility, and lower costs.
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the balance between the advance at both the in-
dividual and the group level, coined by Hirschman 
under the term “tunnel effect”. 
The tunnel effect is a phenomenon -according to 
Hirschman- which counteracts the envy effect, whi-
ch is generated, in principle, when one perceives 
that the others are advancing or doing better than 
oneself. The tunnel effect consists of taking into 
account what is happening to my neighbor as an 
indication of what the future might have in store for 
me. Suppose that the individual has very little infor-
mation about his future income, but at some point 
a few of her relatives, neighbors or acquaintances 
improve their economic or social position. Now she 
has something to go on: expecting that her turn 
will come in due course, she “will draw gratifi cation 
from the advances of others –for a while” (Hirsch-
man and Rothschild, 1973, p. 545).
Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) emphasize the di-
fference between various “theories of success”. If in-
dividual advances are attributed primarily to  chance, 
the success of others will occasion the tunnel effect; 
“for the next time fortune strikes, I may well be the 
lucky one”. In this case, if there exists the belief that 
the world is governed by chance, then the tunnel 
effect is considered a valuable -though volatile- re-
source to achieve growth. If, on the other hand, 
success of others is likely to be attributed to affi  nity 
(i.e. nepotism, favoritism, familism) rather than to, 
for example, “capabilities” there would not be any 
“initial feeling of anticipatory gratifi cation among 
those who are not participating in the division of 
the spoils”. 
Parquesoft resembles, not the chance or the affi nity 
case mentioned previously, but rather a case of mo-
bility based on the “capability” or “capacity” to gene-
rate success via the tunnel effect or social entrepre-
neurship. This institutional change –due to historic 
forces of resilience to the tolerance to social mobility 
via illegal activities– recovers the effort, hard work 
and informal networking, as cultural values in which 
social entrepreneurs, as we shall see below, rely as 
coordinating devices in the software industry. 
Figure 3.
Cultural and Social Change: Creative destruction Vs Destructive creation
(a) Period 1970s-1990s
Criminal “Bubble”
 FORMAL SECTOR CRIMINAL SECTOR
 Culture Social Structure Culture Social Structure
 Necessary Conditions:    Tolerance to illegal
 trust, hard work   Destructive creation transfer of arbitrary
 and effort  VS. Creative destruction privileges
  Individual  (bubble effect in the  Cartels, Killer and
  entrepreneurship:  right hand side)  kidnapping networks
  industrial elite 
 Social Exclusion   Easy money, apparent 
    inclusive activities
  Destructive (negative)    Selfi nforcing (positive)
  loop   loop
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4. Case Study: Parquesoft
4.1 A brief on History
During 1997, social entrepreneur in software in-
dustry and founder of companies like Open systems 
and Parquesoft Orlando Rincon, visited Ireland and 
India, two countries transformed into global  leaders 
and with very similar conditions as Colombia at the 
time. He observed it was possible to build up, with a 
relatively low investment, a Technological Clus ter of 
Software. The idea was to replicate in Colombia the 
independent enterprises concept  which  share spa-
ces and support services, interact and make business 
between them. Parquesoft´s start-up investment was 
around US$150.000 together with a donation of 
Orlando’s old headquarters (worth US$30,000). It 
started by incubating three start-ups with 20 indivi-
duals and now they have helped create 200 com-
panies with more than 1000 individuals. In 1999, 
Parquesoft´s enterprises netted US$100,000 in 
reve nues; by 2004, that fi gure was US$6 million. 
Their goal for 2008 is to double the companies and 
involve 3000 individuals more and generate more 
than US$100 million in sales. They opened two 
international offi ces in Miami and in Silicon Valley. 
They count with more than 800 software developers 
and diverse alliances with regional universities. They 
have also strategic alliances with Microsoft, IBM 
and Oracle and they work in diverse topics as optic 
software and bioinformatics. This proved to be an 
excellent opportunity for the city of Cali, which had 
been embedded in a signifi cant economic crises and 
social identity, given the perverse impact of illegal 
drug cartels in the 80s and 90s (Parquesoft 2006).
Business elites of the Valle del Cauca, during the 
decade of the 1970s and until, approximately, the 
fi rst half of the 1990s, co-existed or co-evolved with 
“other industrialists” associated with illegal drug car-
tels. The latter are characterized by Baumol (1990, 
1993) as “destructive” industrialists or “predators” 
given their innate culture to use illegitimate means 
like corruption and violence and other illegal ac-
tivities, so as to fulfi ll their ends5. It was not until 
the end of the 1990s and early stages of 2000 that 
Figure 3.
Continuación
(b) Period 1990s-2000s
Tunnel Effect
 FORMAL SECTOR CRIMINAL SECTOR
 Culture Social Structure Culture Social Structure
 Necessary Conditions:   Destructive creation Tolerance to illegal
 trust and hard work   VS. Creative destruction transfer of arbitrary
 and effort Social entrepreneurship: (tunnel effect in the left  privileges Cartels, Killer and
  Parquesoft hand side)  kidnapping networks 
 Social Mobility and    Social costs (i.e.
 Impact   violence, killer networks, 
    cartels, kidnapping, 
    rampant delinquency)
  Selfi nforcing (positive)    Destructive (negative)
  loop   loop
5 The “other industrialists” are classifi ed as predators because there is an absence of an ethos regarding the ´public service´ which 
prevents its members of differencing between the collective and the individual interests. All this would endure the coexistence with 
illegal drug traffi cking and the public management of resources (Urrea y Mejía, 2000, p. 169).
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society and organizations like Parquesoft could 
over co me this artifi cial co-existence with the “other 
industrialists” by recovering their historical values 
rooted in a strong social entrepreneurship culture 
(Urrea y Mejía, 2000).
The organization of Parquesoft is based on models 
of social ventures, led by exceptional, visionary indi-
viduals; and developed into self-sustained organiza-
tions, widely recognized as being both socially and 
economically successful. They pool fi nancing sources 
for start-ups and R&D projects and in which profi ts 
are reinvested in newcomers. It is, in other words, a 
“pay-it-forward” type of model which builds up a spi-
ral of start-ups and innovation projects, generating 
externalities and social capital for all incumbents. 
4.2 How it does it? 
The particular characteristics of Parquesoft make it 
a sustainable alternative of development; but ¿What 
kind of conditions are these? The following lines des-
cribe some of them. The park has a networking or-
ganizational structure with a good balance between 
fl exibility and control. Strong relations between 
park’s enterprises and persistent interaction at insi-
de characterize the existence of well-built links in 
the network, therefore the information fl ows much 
well than in other kind of organizational structures. 
Parquesoft’s strategy is spontaneous and informal; 
there is no plan that establish responsibilities and 
resources for each strategy; it arises from the impul-
se of develop and exploit its resources and abilities. 
The park’s principal strength is its intangibles resour-
ces because the work revolves around the entrepre-
neurial ideas and the knowledge networks (Salcedo, 
2004). 
There is no promotional advertisement to attract en-
trepreneurs. Young people arrive to the park  after 
heard about it through their friends and acquain-
tances, “the ideas, motivation and ability to ta ke 
initial risk without economic rewards are the kind 
of condition that evaluates the committee” (Inter-
view: Alfredo Roldán). The biggest proportion of 
beginners on Parquesoft is young people; this has 
an additional deep reason: young people are a 
population’s critical mass in Colombia and require 
the appropriate spaces to build its future (Claros, 
2006). The most important compromises of entre-
preneurial community are of qualitative type; they 
need to have a strong identifi cation with park’s phi-
losophy, hard work, and built respectful relations-
hips based in trust. 
Trust between Parquesoft’s members is a great for-
ce; the agreements and contracts (even in  business) 
are paperless; verbal agreements are the rule. Achie-
vements and results is all that matters. Local govern-
ment, associations and private sector have a main 
role as allies and collaborators. The conjunction of 
tangibles and intangibles resources gives to Parque-
soft unique abilities like team work, high learning 
curves, coaching, managing to achieve good con-
tacts, good adaptation to changes, specialization 
and economy (Salcedo, 2004). 
4.3 Opinion Survey to Parquesoft agents
With the intention to test the previous characteristics 
of Parquesoft and its relationship with the social im-
pact of Parquesoft in its environment. It was made a 
opinion survey to Parquesoft members (Park direc-
tor, Consulting member or Parquesoft Entrepreneur, 
Enterprising, Benefi ciary, Associated enterprise or 
Others) looking to know the personal experience 
of members in the everyday work in Parquesoft and 
their opinion and perception about the values, re-
sources and social impact of Parquesoft. The survey 
had 27 questions distributed in 4 groups: personal 
information, experiences since entry to the park, ex-
periences in the work with Parquesoft and Personal 
opinion. The survey was made via e-mail by offi cial 
communication through Parquesoft during august 
of 2006. It includes answers of fi ve kinds of agents; 
the fi rst category: Park director, Consulting member 
or Parquesoft Entrepreneur there’s 2 answers; 18 
answers on second category: Enterprising, one on 
Benefi ciary category, 8 on fourth category: Associa-
ted enterprise and 2 classifi ed like other.
The data analysis used was Qualitative Comparati-
ve Analysis using Fuzzy Sets. And data processing 
was made using fs/QCA 2.0 (Windows program 
for crisp and fuzzy sets) (Ragin, Kriss, Sean, 2006). 
This kind of method for social data analysis is use-
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ful when the number of cases is short because the 
analysis is both intensive -addressing many aspects 
of cases- and integrative -examining how the diffe-
rent parts of a case fi t together, both contextually 
and historically. Two types of solution for each mo-
del were made, truth table solution is more stringent 
and fuzzy sets solutions seek a wider point of view. 
The solution presents suffi cient and necessary con-
ditions but not causal relationships.
The original questions in the survey were put in di-
fferent categories like conditions and the  options 
in grades of membership scores in the interval 0 
and 1 according with a fuzzy sets classifi cation of 
membership. In order to explain the sources of so-
cial impact, the analysis seeks logical relations in 
different impact levels. The variables were reorga-
nized into 8 groups or models; the fi rst 5 models 
test the perception about social impact with regard 
to combinations of conditions related with the insti-
tutional rules of Parquesoft and immediate impacts 
over the agents and their environment; these rules 
refl ects the fi rm’s values and principles of action. 
The remaining models test specifi c fi rm impacts in 
the exercise of particular capabilities.
In brief, according to the Boolean analysis there are 
more restrictive conditions that are required as ne-
cessary and/or suffi cient in order to have a social 
impact. Fuzzy set analysis instead “dims” a bit this 
radical approximation, pointing out less restrictive 
conditions in order to generate social impact. The 
Boolean analysis points out a more complex and 
restrictive set of conditions, but the fuzzy set  analysis 
pins down which are the variables that we cannot dis-
regard in the case of study as necessary  conditions. 
For the study case, these critical variables are: trust 
and hard work and effort. Without these cultural va-
riables, organizations such as Parquesoft probably 
would not be able to generate a social impact. This 
is why trust and hard work and effort are considered 
extremely important for Parquesoft´s objectives. 
5. Conclusions
The evolution of an unequal society like Colombia 
has followed a cultural and social change leading to 
a tension between productive and destructive forces. 
Given that individual entrepreneurs linked to social 
and State elite drove society in the past through 
an exclusive formal industrial sector, a tolerance to 
illegal means for social advancement ensued. Self-
enforcing mechanisms like the “Robin Hood” effect 
(wealth transfer from rich to poor countries through 
illegal psychoactive drug-dealing) and an apparent 
inclusive re-distribution of wealth, created the collec-
tive “illusion” of a new viable way for social enhan-
cement. This collective chimera did not last especia-
lly when social costs became evident.
During the period 1990s-2000s (Figure 1 (b), the 
Tunnel Effect, term coined by Albert Hirschman 
and Rothschild (1973), in social organizations such 
as Parquesoft began to rise. The tunnel effect gene-
rated signifi cant social impacts through social,  rather 
than merely individual, entrepreneurship. 
The embeddedness argument presented by Granno-
vetter (1985) manifests in Parquesoft through net-
works tightly knitted with schools of marginalized 
sectors in Cali coupled with their own entrepreneu-
rial schools. These schools recruit students, allowing 
them to learn and cooperate with previously trained 
entrepreneurs, but under the condition of sharing 
their experience and knowledge in the future
The institutional framework for cooperation of Par-
quesoft is a “pay-it forward” or social entrepre neurship 
type of model. It is a continuum of reco vering and 
development of values and norms of cooperation, 
trust, effort and hard work, common ly found in deve-
loping countries marginalized popu lation, a socially 
enriching learning process expan ding in a transver-
sal sector such as software development. The social 
entrepreneurial role plays an important part coupled 
with an institutional frame work of embedded activi-
ties drawing from social values and networks. 
Why the software industry? Not only for technolo-
gical reasons but also because it is a knowledge or 
human based sector, generating social mobility and, 
because it is transversal, it permeates all industrial 
sectors generating self – enforcing loops. Parquesoft 
has a particular characteristic that makes it different 
to others alternatives like formal and traditional ac-
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tivities or illegal activities (drugs traffi c). Trust, hard 
work and effort, networks and cooperation systems 
are their guiding values and principles of action. A 
non-contractual relationship governs the everyday 
operation; it leads to a social inclusive model in whi-
ch all levels of society have a place.
The big difference that Parquesoft´s model offer 
young people in relation to illegal activities model 
is that it offers a new way to see business from a 
social standpoint; looking for an income and  wealth 
redistribution like a main objective. In other kind of 
models the redistribution and the social intention 
are just secondary goals.
The existence of Parquesoft does not imply that le-
gal activities are disappearing –far from it. It just 
indicates the emergence of new micro – social phe-
nomena that induce changes in the economic and 
social structures. This is why we emphasize in the 
coexistence and tension between Destructive Crea-
tion and Creative Destruction. However, the usual 
international image portrayed in the media (and al-
most anywhere) is that there only exist a rampant 
illegal bias, which is neglecting an important social 
micro phenomenon that has generated important 
economic changes, in particular through new tech-
nologies like software industry.
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